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Some Characterizations of Convex Interval Games
Rodica Branzei∗, Stef Tijs∗∗, S. Zeynep Alparslan G¨ ok†
Abstract This paper focuses on two characterizations of convex interval games using the no-
tions of superadditivity and exactness, respectively. We also relate big boss interval games with
concave interval games and obtain characterizations of big boss interval games in terms of sub-
additivity and exactness.
Keywords Cooperative interval games, convex games, big boss games, superadditive games,
marginal games, exact games
JEL classiﬁcation C71 ∗ ∗∗†
1. Introduction
Convex interval games were introduced in Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs (2008a),
where also several characterizations of this class of games are provided (Theorems
3.1, 4.1 and 5.2). Our aim is to extend the list of existing characterizations of convex
interval games by using properties of their subgames and marginal games.
Recall that a traditional cooperative game is a pair hN,vi, where N = {1,...,n}
with n as a natural number, is a set of players and v is a characteristic function v :
2N → R with v(/ 0) = 0. The family of all cooperative games with player set N is
denoted by GN. A game hN,vi is called superadditive if v(S∪T) ≥ v(S)+v(T) for
all S,T ⊂ N with S∩T = / 0; it is called subadditive if v(S∪T) ≤ v(S)+v(T) for
all S,T ⊂ N with S∩T = / 0. A game hN,vi is called convex (or supermodular) if
v(S∪T)+v(S∩T) ≥ v(S)+v(T) for all S,T ⊂ N; it is called concave (or submodular)
if v(S∪T)+v(S∩T) ≤ v(S)+v(T) for all S,T ⊂ N. Each convex (concave) game is
also superadditive (subadditive). For S ⊂ N, the subgame of v based on S, (S,vS), is
obtained from hN,vi by restricting attention to S, i.e. vS(T) = v(T) for all T ∈ 2S. For
T ⊂ N, the marginal game of v based on T is deﬁned by vT(S) = v(S∪T)−v(T) for
each S ⊂ N\T. Convex games are balanced games, i.e. the core (Gillies 1959) of such
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xi ≥ v(S) for each S ∈ 2N
)
.
A game hN,vi is called exact if for each S∈2N \{/ 0} there is an x∈C(v) with åi∈Sxi =
v(S). It is well known that: subgames of convex games are also convex (and subgames
of concave games are also concave); convex games are (total) exact games and total
exact games (i.e. games whose all subgames are also exact) are convex (Biswas et al.
1999, Azrieli and Lehrer 2007); games whose marginal games are all superadditive are
convex (Branzei, Dimitrov and Tijs 2004, Martinez-Legaz 1997, 2006).
Let v ∈ GN and n ∈ N. Then, this game is a (total) big boss game with n as a big
boss if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) v ∈ GN is monotonic, i.e. v(S) ≤ v(T) if for all S,T ∈ 2N with S ⊂ T;
(ii) v(S) = 0 if n / ∈ S;




for all S,T with n ∈ S ⊂ T.
The next two propositions and the deﬁnition of suitable marginal games for big boss
games are obtained from Propositions 2 and 3 in Branzei, Dimitrov and Tijs (2006)
with {n} in the role of C.
Proposition 1. Let hN,vi ∈ MVN,{n}. Then hN,vi is a total big boss game with big
boss n if and only if the marginal game hN\{n},v{n}i is a concave game.
Here, MVN,{n} is the set of all monotonic games on N satisfying the big boss property
with respect to the big boss n. Given a game hN,vi ∈ MVN,{n} and a coalition T ∈
2N\{n}, the n-based T-marginal game (v{n})T : 2N\T → R is deﬁned by
(v{n})T(S) = v(S∪T ∪{n})−v(T ∪{n})
for each S ⊂ N\T.
Proposition 2. Let hN,vi ∈ MVN,{n}. Then the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) hN,vi is a (total) big boss game with big boss n;




i is a subadditive game for each T ⊂ N\{n};
(iv) hN\({n}∪T),v{n}∪Ti is a subadditive game for each T ⊂ N\{n}.
The reader is referred to Branzei, Dimitrov and Tijs (2008) for a survey of classical
cooperative game theory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall basic deﬁni-
tions and results for cooperative interval games which are used in Sections 3 and 4.
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In Section 3, we deﬁne superadditive, exact and marginal interval games and give
characterizations of convex interval games using the notions of superadditivity and ex-
actness. A theoretical application of these new characterizations of convex interval
games is provided in Section 4. Speciﬁcally, we relate big boss interval games with
concave interval games and obtain characterizations for big boss interval games using
the notions of exactness and subadditivity. Big boss interval games are introduced in
Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs (2008b), where some characterizations of this class of
games are provided (Propositions 3.1, 3.2 and Theorems 3.1, 3.2).
2. Preliminaries on cooperative interval games
A cooperative interval game in coalitional form (Alparslan G¨ ok, Miquel and Tijs 2008)
isanorderedpairhN,wiwhereN ={1,2,...,n}isthesetofplayers, andw:2N →I(R)
is the characteristic function such that w(/ 0) = [0,0], where I(R) denotes the set of all
closed intervals in R. For each S ∈ 2N, the worth set (or worth interval) w(S) of the




, where w(S) is the
lower bound and w(S) is the upper bound of w(S). We denote by IGN the family of all
cooperative interval games with player set N.
Some classical TU-games associated with an interval game w ∈ IGN play a key
role, namely the border games hN,wi, hN,wi and the length game hN,|w|i, where
|w|(S) = w(S)−w(S) for each S ∈ 2N.
For the theory of cooperative interval games interval calculus (Moore 1979) is a

















. The partial substraction operator I −J is




. We say that I is weakly better than
J, which we denote by I < J, if and only if I ≥ J and I ≥ J. We also use the reverse
notation J 4 I, if and only if J ≤ I and J ≤ I. We denote by I(R)N the set of all
n-dimensional vectors whose elements belong to I(R).
For a game w ∈ IGN and a coalition S ∈ 2N \{/ 0}, the interval subgame with player
set T is the game wT deﬁned by wT(S) = w(S) for all S ∈ 2T, i.e. wT is the restriction
of w to the set 2T.
We call a game hN,wi supermodular if
w(S)+w(T) 4 w(S∪T)+w(S∩T) for all S,T ∈ 2N.
We call a game w ∈ IGN convex if hN,wi is supermodular and its length game hN,|w|i
is also supermodular. We denote by CIGN the class of convex interval games with
player set N. An interval game hN,wi is called concave if hN,wi and hN,|w|i are
submodular, i.e. w(S)+w(T) < w(S∪T)+w(S∩T) and |w|(S)+|w|(T) ≥ |w|(S∪
T)+|w|(S∩T), for all S,T ∈ 2N.
Proposition 3. (Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs 2008a)
Let w ∈ IGN. Then the following assertions hold:
(i) A game hN,wi is supermodular if and only if its border games hN,wi and hN,wi
are convex;
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(ii) A game hN,wi is convex if and only if its length game hN,|w|i and its border
games hN,wi, hN,wi are convex;
(iii) A game hN,wi is convex if and only if its border game hN,wi and the game
hN,w−wi are convex.
We call a game hN,wi a big boss interval game if its border game hN,wi and the
game hN,|w|i are classical (total) big boss games. We denote by BBIGN the set of all
big boss interval games with player set N (without loss of generality we denote the big
boss by n).
Proposition 4. (Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs 2008b)
Let w ∈ IGN. Then, w ∈ BBIGN if and only if its length game hN,|w|i and its border
games hN,wi, hN,wi are (total) big boss games.







Ii < w(S),∀S ∈ 2N \{/ 0}
)
.
We call a game hN,wi size monotonic if hN,|w|i is monotonic, i.e. |w|(S) ≤ |w|(T)
for all S,T ∈ 2N with S ⊂ T.
Let hN,wi be a size monotonic game and let s ∈ P(N), where P(N) is the set of
permutations s : N → N. The interval marginal vector of w with respect to s, ms(w),
corresponds to a situation, where the players enter a room one by one in the order
s(1),s(2),...,s(n) and each player is given the marginal contribution he/she creates
by entering. Let Ps(i) =
￿
r ∈ N|s−1(r) < s−1(i)
￿
denote the set of predecessors of i
in s, where s−1(i) denotes the entrance number of player i, and we deﬁne
ms
i (w) = w(Ps(i)∪{i})−w(Ps(i)) for each i ∈ N.
An interesting subclass of size monotonic games hN,wi is CIGN because all interval
marginal vectors of a convex interval game belong to the interval core of the game (see
Theorem 4.1 in Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs 2008a).
3. Two characterizations of convex interval games
We call a game w ∈ IGN superadditive if for all S,T ⊂ N with S∩T = / 0,
w(S∪T) < w(S)+w(T), (1)
|w|(S∪T) ≥ |w|(S)+|w|(T).
Remark 1. First, we note that (1) is equivalent to the superadditivity of the lower
game and the upper game. Additionally, notice that, by Proposition 3, if w ∈ CIGN,
then hN,wi is superadditive; further, hN,|w|i, hN,wi and hN,wi are superadditive.
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Given a game hN,wi and a coalition T ⊂N, the T-marginal interval game wT :2N\T →
I(R) is deﬁned by wT(S) = w(S∪T)−w(T) for each S ⊂ N\T.
Marginal interval games are used in our ﬁrst new characterization of convex inter-
val games. The next proposition provides an afﬁrmative answer to the question: If the
original interval game is convex, are all its marginal interval games also convex?
Proposition 5. Let hN,wi be a convex game and T ⊂ N. Then, hN\T,wTi is a convex
game.
Proof. Let w ∈ CIGN. Then, hN,wi and hN,|w|i are supermodular. From this we





Similarly, the supermodularity (convexity) of hN \T,|wT|i follows from the supermo-
dularity (convexity) of hN,|w|i. Hence, wT ∈CIGN\T. ￿
Theorem 1. Let w ∈ IGN. Then, the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) w ∈CIGN;
(ii) hN\T,wTi is superadditive for each T ⊂ N.
Proof. First, we notice that by Proposition 3 w ∈ CIGN if and only if hN,wi, hN,wi
and hN,|w|i are convex games. Now, using the characterization of classical convex
games based on the superadditivity of marginal games (Branzei, Dimitrov and Tijs
2004, Martinez-Legaz 1997, 2006), we obtain that hN,wi, hN,wi and hN,|w|i are con-
vex if and only if for each T ⊂ N, hN \T,wTi, hN \T,wTi and hN \T,|wT|i are su-
peradditive games. Further, by Proposition 3 and Remark 1 this is equivalent to the
superadditivity of hN\T,wTi for each T ⊂ N. ￿
For a traditional cooperative game hN,vi, Biswas et al. (1999) proved that the game is
convex if and only if each subgame hS,vi, with S ⊂ N, is an exact game. In the sequel,
we prove that a similar characterization holds true in the interval data setting.
We call a game w ∈ IGN an exact interval game if for each S ∈ 2N:
(i) there exists I = (I1,...,In) ∈ C(w) such that åi∈SIi = w(S);
(ii) there exists x ∈C(|w|) such that åi∈Sxi = |w|(S).
Note that (ii) expresses the exactness of the lenght game hN,|w|i.
Proposition 6. Each convex interval game w ∈ IGN is an exact interval game.
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Proof. First, the convexity of w ∈ IGN implies by Theorem 4.1 in Alparslan G¨ ok,
Branzei and Tijs (2008a) that |w| is supermodular (and consequently monotonic) and
ms(w) ∈ C(w) for each s ∈ P(N). So, let S = {s1,...,sk} and s ∈ P(N) be such
that s(r) = sr for r = 1,...,k. Then, åi∈Sms
i (w) = w(S). Further, the convexity of
w ∈ IGN implies that hN,|w|i is convex and consequently it is an exact game, i.e. for
each S ∈ 2N there exists x ∈C(|w|) such that åi∈Sxi = |w|(S). ￿
Remark 2. For a given S ∈ 2N and I = (I1,...,In) ∈ C(w), åi∈SIi = w(S) also de-
livers (I1,...,In) ∈C(w), (I1,...,In) ∈C(w) and (I1 −I1,...,In −In) ∈C(|w|), with
åi∈SIi = w(S), åi∈SIi = w(S) and åi∈S(Ii−Ii) = |w|(S). This can be used for extend-
ing the characterization of Biswas et al. (1999) to interval games.
Theorem 2. Let w ∈ IGN. Then the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) w ∈CIGN;
(ii) hT,wTi is exact for each T ⊂ N.
Proof. (i) → (ii) follows from Proposition 6 because each subgame of a convex inter-
val game is convex, and hence exact.
(ii) → (i) From the exactness of each interval subgame hT,wTi we obtain that hN,wTi,
hN,wTi and hN,|wT|i are exact games for each T ⊂ N. Now, we use the result of
Biswas et al. (1999) and obtain that the games hN,wi, hN,wi and hN,|w|i are all con-
vex. By Proposition 3 we obtain that w ∈CIGN. ￿
4. An application
The two characterizations of convex interval games provided by Theorems 1 and 2 are
interesting from the theoretical point of view. In this section we use them to derive new
characterizations of big boss interval games based on the notions of subadditivity and
exactness.
Remark 3. In view of Theorem 1 we obtain that a game w ∈ IGN is concave if and
only if for each T ∈ 2N the marginal interval game hN\T,wTi is subadditive.
Remark 4. In view of Theorem 2, a game w ∈ IGN is concave if and only if hT,wTi is
exact for each T ⊂ N.
We denote by MIGN,{n} the set of all size monotonic interval games on N that satisfy
the big boss property with respect to n (the big boss player).
Proposition 7. Let w ∈ MIGN,{n}. Then, w ∈ BBIGN if and only if the marginal inter-
val game hN\{n},w{n}i is a concave interval game.
Proof. Let w ∈ BBIGN. By Proposition 4 this is equivalent to hN,wi, hN,wi and
hN,|w|i being (total) big boss games with n as a big boss, which implies that hN,wi,
hN,wi and hN,|w|i ∈ MVN,{n}. Now, by Proposition 1 we obtain that hN,wi, hN,wi
and hN,|w|i are (total) big boss games, if and only if hN \{n},w{n}i, hN \{n},w{n}i
and hN \{n},|w{n}|i are concave, which is equivalent with the marginal game hN \
{n},w{n}i being a concave interval game. ￿
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Proposition 8. Let w ∈ MIGN,{n}. Then, the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) w ∈ BBIGN;
(ii) Each marginal interval game of hN\{n},w{n}i is subadditive;
(iii) Each (interval) subgame of hN\{n},w{n}i is exact.
Proof. (i) ↔ (ii) follows from Proposition 7 and Remark 3. (i) ↔ (iii) follows from
Proposition 7 and Remark 4. ￿
Now, we extend in the context of cooperative interval games the deﬁnition of the n-
based T-marginal game (v{n})T, where T ∈ 2N\{n}. Let hN,wi ∈ MIGN,{n} and T ∈
2N\{n}. The n-based T-marginal interval game (w{n})T : 2N\T → I(R) is deﬁned by
(w{n})T(S) = w(S∪T ∪{n})−w(T ∪{n})
for each S ⊂ N\T.
Based on the characterization of big boss interval games using its border and length
games we can easily extend Proposition 2 from classical cooperative games to coope-
rative interval games.
Proposition 9. Let hN,wi ∈ MIGN,{n}. Then the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) hN,wi is a big boss interval game with big boss n;




i is a subadditive game for each T ⊂ N\{n};
(iv) hN\({n}∪T),w{n}∪Ti is a subadditive game for each T ⊂ N\{n}.
Proof. (i)↔(ii) follows from Proposition 7; (ii)↔(iii) holds by Remark 3; (iii)↔(iv)
follows from the deﬁnition of the n-based T-marginal interval game. ￿
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